The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IX, Issue 2 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2004-02-06
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IX, Issue
2
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/12032
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 9, Number 2 (February 6, 2004) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
CREEP 
With the announcement that President Putin’s signature collection drive has been 
deemed a success, the incumbent’s presidential campaign is finally gearing up 
for the month-long challenge. According to the head of Putin’s voter initiative 
group, Oleg Katulin, who is also a rector of Moscow State Law Academy, 8 
million signatures were gathered in support of Putin’s presidential bid. After 
rigorous examination by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), only 1.16% of 
the signatures of a test sample were evaluated as being of questionable 
provenance. (1) 
 
The CEC Chairman, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, took the opportunity of the media’s 
interest in the presidential campaigns to explain the process of signature 
verification. The CEC runs two shifts of up to one hundred workers who look for 
31 signs of questionable certification. Confirmation of the signature generally 
comes in the form of personal data from the passport of individual signatories. 
The signature lists should also contain a verifiable signature by an authorized 
representative of the candidate. (2) 
 
Putin received the go-ahead from the CEC with signatures to spare, therefore the 
Kremlin has moved to establish his campaign office for the March elections. 
While Dmitri Medvedev has headed Putin’s campaigns previously, Dmitri Kozak 
will lead the incumbent President’s bid this year. [Previously, when Medvedev led 
the campaign staff, he held the title of First Deputy Head of the Presidential 
Administration. He is now the Chief of Staff and Kozak has the "First Deputy" 
title.] 
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While the Center is just getting its main campaign staff together, one aspect of 
the presidential election campaign is progressing quite rapidly: The regional 
structures and each region’s leading lights have nearly all been recruited to 
ensure that Putin’s name, virtues, and bright intentions are front and center for 
the electorate — and to ensure that they turn out to mark their ballots properly 
too, of course. Clearly, this work is advancing in conjunction with the signature 
gathering effort. Whether this is being run by direct Kremlin intervention, through 
regional representatives (of any one of a number of branches of service), or at 
the initiative of savvy local leaders, it is obvious that the regions are performing 
as if they have significant incentives (or are avoiding significant disincentive) for 
their effort on behalf of the committee to re-elect the President. 
 
Putin’s philosophy for winning a second (last?) term sits firmly on three broad 
pillars: physical security (counteracting terrorism, reducing the level of conflict in 
Chechnya, fighting bandit groups); social services provisions (hence the State 
Council meeting on the needs of pensioners); and economic security (this may 
explain, in part, why Mikhail Khodorkovsky sits in jail). 
 
Putin has honed these themes in a series of speeches given since mid-January. 
Putin delivered a speech before an enlarged session of the Federal Security 
Services board on January 15 (3), which explicitly outlined his strategy. In 
addition to stressing the importance of the security services in "counteracting 
terrorism," Putin further detailed his concept of "guaranteeing economic security." 
 
While the president did stress the important role of the entire law enforcement 
system in protecting the individual from both criminal and "if necessary, from 
administrative arbitrariness," he added an unusual, but populist emphasis on the 
protection of intellectual property, "the systemic protection of Russian design and 
technologies." (4) 
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Putin also touched lightly, but intriguingly, on the issue of illegal migrations. While 
noting the steps taking towards "liberalizing migration legislation" Putin goes on 
to complain however, that illegal migrants are entering border regions where they 
are not needed. "Russia needs an inflow of labor," he concludes "but it needs 
them in particular places." (5) 
 
He did also mention the problems of illegal immigration that left the migrants 
without rights under law and therefore subject to criminal and administrative 
illegalities at any number of levels, thus increasing the potential for criminal 
activity and violations, especially in identifiable border regions. 
 
At an address to the State Council Presidium not quite two weeks later, Putin 
sounded another theme, which he subsequently raised in governmental 
meetings: the social protection of pensioners–a subject that has needed urgent 
attention for a decade. Putin notes that there are nearly 30 million pensioners in 
need of services. (6) While touching familiar political ground by claiming never to 
have "made empty promises," and decrying those who would just "pump more 
money into the social sector," Putin suggests a joint governmental-legislative 
effort to assign responsibility at the local levels for the distribution of services. He 
also recommends the creation of "a real market for social services and…in 
introducing innovative forms of social assistance." (7) It is well nigh time the 
Kremlin took the needs of its aged population seriously, and while Putin may well 
be simply handing out campaign candy, perhaps he will force some movement in 
the regions for the protection of local elderly residents. 
 
By the end of the month, Putin addressed the college of the General Prosecutor’s 
Office, where, instead of making the standard pitch for criminal prevention, Putin 
noted the changes his administration (chiefly under the direction of Dmitri Kozak) 
had made to the judicial system. Prosecutors will have far less involvement in 
investigatory work, and will focus primarily on the prosecution of charges in 
order, in part, to prevent the far-too-frequent patterns of individuals being 
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incarcerated for months, if not years, only to stand trial and be acquitted due to 
either flimsy evidence, or poor prosecution work. The prosecutor, claimed Putin, 
"now bears the responsibility for proving and justifying the charges made." (8) 
 
Citing last year’s statistics, Putin noted that 3 million crimes were "registered" last 
year: "one in every ten…committed by teenagers," and more than one third of all 
crimes went unsolved.(9) It was, however, the Prosecutor’s supervisory function 
that seemed to draw the President’s attention. Putin called on the Prosecutors to 
be more active in preventative measures and fighting economic corruption. Putin 
also seemed intent to remind prosecutors that fighting economic crime was not 
meant to create another avenue for corruption. "Legality," he reminded them, "is 
a general state concept and not a political or agency-based category." (10) 
 
Putin has certainly launched his campaign with a solid electoral strategy, despite 
the dearth of realistic opposition challenge. His policies sound reasonable and 
even hopeful. Now if only the security services would step away from the 
presidential levers of power, and leave governing to the choice of the governed, 
we could rejoice in Russia’s presidential election season, and perhaps a 
challenger or two might emerge to force even more detailed policy promises and 
campaign commitments. 
 
Source notes: 
1. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 Feb 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
2. Moskovskie novosti weekly, No. 3 2004; What the Papers Say via Lexis-
Nexis. 
3. www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/01/151541_59273.shtml 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/01/271341_59939.shtml 
7. Ibid. 
8. www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/01/301948_60033.shtml 
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9. Ibid 
10. Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Fallout from Moscow bombing case continues 
In December 2003, the FSB seized 4,000 copies of the book "The FSB Blows Up 
Russia," written by FSB defector Aleksandr Litvinenko. At the time, the Security 
Services claimed that the book was unfit for public consumption because it 
constituted "anti-government propaganda." (1) 
 
In the last two weeks however, the FSB seems to have broadened the scope of 
its investigation; A criminal case is now being built, based upon the allegation 
that the book reveals classified information. (2) 
 
On 28 January, Alexander Podrabinek, editor-in-chief of Prima, the news agency 
which originally purchased the 4,000 books later seized by the FSB, was 
summoned to Lefortovo prison by the FSB, where he underwent intensive 
questioning by counterintelligence officers. Podrabinek was released without 
charge the same day. Two days after his release, Podrabinek gave interviews by 
telephone to The Moscow Times and Ekho Moskvy. Podrabinek reported that he 
had been questioned at length about Prima’s financial dealings. He reported that 
he had refused to answer their questions, because the interrogation had "nothing 
to do with the state secrets case," and "everything to do with us." (3) He added 
that his questioning and the seizure of the books amounted to "a shock attack on 
freedom of the press in Russia." (4) 
 
The fact that Podrabinek made this statement is particularly striking. He was a 
dissident in the Soviet-era, and served time in prison as a political prisoner for 
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several years during the 1970s. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, he has 
continued his political activities, traveling to Cuba and China amongst other 
locations, to "advise dissidents in places that are still under communist rule." (5) 
Prima News agency was founded in 2000, and Podrabinek has been its editor-in-
chief since its inception. 
 
Podrabinek believes that his interrogation is an indication that the FSB in fact, is 
guilty as charged by Litvinenko and Mikhail Trepashkin, stating that "the fact that 
they opened the case under this part of the criminal code [on state secrets] is an 
indirect admission that they participated in the explosions." (6) Yet, if the FSB 
truly wants to clear this matter up, Podrabinek seems to have offered it the 
perfect opportunity to do so. Podrabinek informed his interviewers that he had 
conveyed an offer from Litvinenko to the FSB. Litvinenko, he said, was prepared 
to undergo in-depth questioning by the FSB, provided that it be carried out in 
London, not Russia. Podrabinek stated that the FSB officers had declined to 
discuss the matter, telling him that a conversation with Litvinenko was 
unnecessary. As yet, Litvinenko has not been charged with any offense, nor has 
his extradition from the United Kingdom been requested by the FSB. 
 
What these events indicate is that the FSB is not really concerned with who, 
outside Russia makes accusations against it. It is concerned only with silencing 
dissent internally. Into this task, it has devoted huge, and so far somewhat 
successful efforts. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the FSB informed 
Podrabinek that he might face criminal charges relating to the book seizure, and 
further that the FSB will seize copies of the book whenever and wherever they 
might find them. (7) 
 
The FSB moves in on Presidential Candidates. 
Presidential elections are due to take place in Russia in March, but the 
intimidation of possible opponents of President Putin has already begun. First, on 
January 27, the leader of the National Bolshevik Party, Eduard Limonov, on radio 
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Ekho Moskvy announced that he had information that the FSB was in the 
process of "closing down" his party's operations. Limonov believes that the FSB 
will pounce early this month. In an attempt to stave off such an event, Limonov 
has sent a letter to the Prosecutor General’s office, requesting protection from 
"renegade FSB officers." (8) 
 
As yet no move has been made against the Bolshevik Party, but the FSB has 
initiated action against the Motherland Bloc. On 31 January, agents raided 
Motherland’s headquarters in Izhevsk. According to Sergey Glazyev, 
Motherland’s leader, the FSB was searching for evidence that Motherland had 
bribed voters in their campaign to collect signatures for Glazyev’s Presidential 
campaign. Although Glazyev has already collected enough signatures to run, the 
final decision as to the identity of the candidates will only be released on 7 
February, by the Central Electoral Commission. (9) 
 
What is interesting about these intimidations is that the one candidate that has 
been voicing concerns over President Putin and the FSB, namely Irina 
Khakamada, has not been touched or interfered with in any way. Khakamada 
openly released an appeal to voters, in which she discussed the 1999 apartment 
bombings and the Dubrovka Theatre siege. Furthermore, Khakamada directly 
accused President Putin of being guilty of "state terrorism." (10) It is difficult to 
know exactly what to make of Khakamada's statements or of the fact that she 
has not been intimidated by the FSB. There seems to be no logical explanation 
for the fact that Khakamada has been allowed to operate freely thus far: the 
Russian Political Monitor, in a piece published on 21 January, claims that Putin 
needs a plausibly genuine opposition candidate to ensure some kind of 
legitimacy for his undoubted re-election. But this theory is flawed in that Putin 
has, on prior occasions, most recently in parliamentary elections, shown little 
concern with the idea that elections should appear legitimate. 
 
Source Notes: 
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1. see NIS OBSERVED: An Analytical Review, Volume XI, Number 01 (23 
Jan 04) 
2. The Moscow Times, 30 Jan 03, "FSB In a Huff About 4,400 Books" via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Washington Post, 15 Oct 97, "The Loneliness of the outdated Soviet 
dissident," via www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1285.html 
6. The Moscow Times, 30 Jan 03, "FSB In a Huff About 4,400 Books," via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
7. BBC Monitoring , 29 Jan 04; Ekho Moskvy News Agency via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
8. BBC Monitoring, 19 Jan 04; Ekho Moskvy News Agency via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
9. BBC Monitoring, 19 Jan 04; Ekho Moskvy News Agency via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
10. WPS Russian Political Monitor, 21 Jan 04, "The Plot Thickens in the 
Presidential Campaign," via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Russian — Georgian "Grand Agreement" shifts 
Russian President Vladimir Putin has relieved Boris Pastukhov of his duties as 
chairman of the Russian state commission for preparing the Russian-Georgian 
draft Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness, Cooperation and Mutual Aid. On 21 
January, Putin signed the decree, giving the task of this so-called "Grand 
Agreement" to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
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The administration of newly inaugurated Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili 
may read this step positively, considering Pastukhov’s reputation in Georgia as a 
"lobbyist of Abkhaz separatists." (1) Such a label is not difficult to imagine, given 
Pastukhov’s ties to Yevgeni Primakov, senior Russian statesman and advocate 
of the integration of Russia’s near-abroad. Pastukhov, who is currently 
Primakov’s deputy at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, previously worked for Primakov at the Foreign Ministry and followed him 
into the government when Primakov became Prime Minster. In 1999 and 2000, 
Pastukhov was a Duma deputy from Primakov’s Fatherland — All Russia faction. 
 
It is unclear if placing responsibility for the Georgian-Russian treaty in the hands 
of the MFA signals friction between Primakov-loyalists and the followers of 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. It may, however, be taken as part of a larger effort 
to clean house, as Putin also relieved Abdul Khakim Sultygor and Dmitri 
Rogozin, special representatives to Chechnya and the Kaliningrad region, 
respectively. 
 
Georgian deputy foreign minister Kakha Sikharulidze welcomed Pastukhov’s 
removal but expressed hope that Russia would replace him with someone who 
"has not been noted to be either lobbying [for] Abkhaz separatists or hampering a 
settlement of Russo-Georgian relations." (2) Here there seems to be a 
misunderstanding, or perhaps false hope on the Georgian side, as the Russian 
Presidential Press Service makes no mention of a replacement or of a temporary 
nature of the reassignment of the duties; rather, it stated, "From now on, Russia’s 
Foreign Ministry will be responsible for the preparation of the treaty."(3) 
 
As Tblisi sees the chairmanship of the treaty process now as an unknown, it is 
thus left to wonder about Moscow’s intentions, which will become evident only 
slowly as the Kremlin begins its dialogue with the new Georgian leadership. 
 
Ivanov: "Russia is becoming predictable." 
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Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has laid out the MFA’s tasks for 2004. 
Working toward its goals of contributing to Russian security and socio-economic 
development, Ivanov appears to see his ministry’s number one task as, 
promoting CIS integration and coordinating CIS inclusion in the world economy. 
Additionally, he intends for the MFA to work in 2004 to resolve crises in the 
Middle East; build up strategic partnerships with China, India, the U.S. and the 
E.U.; and do more "so that our compatriots abroad feel themselves more 
protected." (4) 
 
Along with these tasks, Ivanov expressed his opinion that over the past decade 
Russia has been strengthening its position in the international arena and 
proclaimed that Russia has overcome the sobriquet given to it by Winston 
Churchill, stating, "Russia ceases to be a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma… and is becoming open and predictable for the outside world." (5) 
 
Some of Russia’s neighbors, foreign investors and global competitors, however, 
may not necessarily interpret "open and predictable" to mean a Russia that is 
now completely reliable and non-threatening. Moreover, while these goals for the 
new year are benignly presented as tasks to help achieve a "global system of 
countering new challenges and threats," (6) Ivanov’s message may also serve to 
reinforce the concerns of countries considered part of Russia’s near-abroad who 
are less interested in integration with Moscow and who have Russia’s 
"compatriots" living within their borders. 
 
Putin keeps West out of post-Soviet air defense 
Among the countries of the Single Economic Space, Kazakhstan may be the 
prime candidate for an eventual union with Russia, according to a Nezavisimaya 
gazeta report (7), especially considering Moscow’s recent problems with Ukraine 
and Belarus. 
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In January, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Astana to strengthen 
Russia’s military, economic and political ties with its southern neighbor even 
further. Whereas the U.S. and E.U. have recently been critical of Kazakhstan’s 
poor human rights record, Putin focused on business while visiting Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev. (8) 
 
Although the summit’s resulting agreements, including one on the status of 
borders, the LUKoil-KazMunaigaz oilfield development cooperation agreement 
[both are discussed in a previous edition of the NIS Observed] and renewal of 
Russia’s lease on the Baikonaur space center through the year 2050 all 
constitute important steps in strengthening the Russian-Kazakh relationship, 
there was an even more significant accomplishment with respect to Moscow’s 
CIS integration goals. During the talks, Putin and his delegation "convinced" 
Astana to reject a bid by Britain, France, Germany and the U.S. to modernize 
Kazakhstan’s air defense system. 
 
The Kremlin, which, according to an Ekho Moskvy radio report prior to Putin’s 
visit, had been concerned about increasing military cooperation between Astana 
and Western countries, including the U.S., Britain, Spain and Turkey, (9) argued 
that such an agreement would violate a 1995 CIS security arrangement to 
establish a single air defense system among the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) member countries. Indeed, the talks resulted in Astana’s backing off 
from a modernization contract with the Western bidders and, in turn, offering the 
opportunity to Russia. Following Putin’s departure, Russian Minister of Defense 
Sergei Ivanov met with his Kazakh counterpart in Moscow where they signed 
agreements in several spheres of military cooperation, including the joint air 
defense system, and discussed the terms of supply of Russian military hardware 
and technologies to Kazakhstan. This successful elimination of what the Kremlin 
portrayed as a Western attempt to intrude on the CIS air defense arrangement 
may be seen as a key triumph in its fight to maintain some semblance of an 
organized defensive structure in the CIS — or at least the appearance of one. 
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Despite these successes and the ground they may have gained for Moscow in 
Central Asia, Putin apparently still came home disappointed that Kazakhstan has 
not abandoned its plans to participate in the Baku-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline project. 
(10) Briefing his cabinet members on the trip, the Russian president suggested 
Russia should consider seriously providing for the transportation of Kazakh 
energy resources. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. Imedi TV, 22 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Prime-TASS, 22 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
4. Federal News Service via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #8020, 16 Jan 04. 
5. ITAR-TASS, 21 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
6. Federal News Service (http://www.fednews.ru/) via Johnson’s Russia List 
(JRL) #8020, 16 Jan 04. 
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring, 28 Jan 04, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
8. Asia Times, 12 Jan 04 via JRL #8011, 13 Jan 04. 
9. Ekho Moskvy, 9 Jan 04 via JRL #8008, 10 Jan 04. 
10. Kommersant, 10 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
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ELECTIONS 
Digging up vote(r)s... 
Fallout continues from the December parliamentary elections, as accusations of 
chicanery abound, while political parties and coalitions teeter on the verge of 
splintering. Meanwhile, a few politicians are preparing for the 14 March 
presidential elections, despite the fact that, as everyone acknowledges (this 
time), the outcome is a foregone conclusion. 
 
The question of how fair elections in Russia can be has evolved into an 
interesting intellectual exercise — almost everyone but the winners seems to 
agree that the parliamentary elections were slanted to ensure victory for United 
Russia, yet there appears to be little political will to do anything about it. The 
party of power remains in power, after all. Even the impending presidential 
elections, which might have served as a catalyst for a thorough investigation of 
the misuse of power during campaigns, won’t do so, since the incumbent 
president currently is polling so high at the moment that it doesn’t really matter (in 
the short term) how fair the elections will be. The long term, however, is an 
entirely different matter. 
 
The parties that fared worse than expected in the December 2003 elections 
continue to decry the manner in which the vote counts were handled. They are 
not alone in their dismay, or in their ineffectiveness, Comments from the 
international community about the abuse of administrative resources, the 
shortage of unbiased media reporting and the sorry state of Russia’s move 
toward democracy (1) have caused minor irritations. however they have largely 
been ignored. US Secretary of State Colin Powell came out strongly against the 
elections (2) — at least for a minute or two — before focusing on the plus side 
(even though he had to go back 30 years to find a situation that was worse) and 
commenting on what he called the country’s "remarkable transformation to a 
democratic system of government." (3) And the OSCE, which should be 
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accustomed to no one listening by now, did issue a report that castigated the 
elections for failing to meet acceptable standards, "most notably those pertaining 
to: unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis, a clear 
separation between the State and political parties, and guarantees to enable 
political parties to compete on the basis of equal treatment." (4) 
 
However, the OSCE report may have missed a critical blip in the "democratic" 
process. While noting the federal Central Election Commission’s (CEC’s) 
generally professional approach to the elections, the OSCE concentrated on the 
voting process itself. It didn’t examine the vote-counting process, which is the 
crux of party complaints. The Union of Right Forces (SPS), YABLOKO and the 
Communist Party (KPRF) came up with a different vote count than the official 
results, which were compiled with the assistance of the Federal Agency for 
Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). The unusual coalition of 
political parties obtained data from the polling stations about the number of votes 
processed, and reportedly found a substantial discrepancy between the number 
of ballots issued and the total number determined to be valid, invalid, annulled, 
etc. Their conclusion: "extra ballots were physically added" — a lot of extra 
ballots, roughly 3.5 million. The ballots allegedly served to dilute votes for SPS, 
YABLOO and the KPRF. (5) 
 
Yet such allegations have spurred no official investigations. Indeed, CEC 
Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov characterized the alternative vote count as 
suspicious, because the server used by the coalition was based in London, and 
not Russia. He subsequently discounted the claims of discrepancies. "[W]hen 
you take a close look, it’s only a matter of one vote here, two votes there, five 
votes somewhere else. Yes, people should be penalized for these discrepancies 
— but you can’t possibly question the outcome to the extent you’re doing!" he 
said. (6) Two of the three parties involved in the vote count — SPS and KPRF — 
have quieted down, but YABLOKO leader Grigori Yavlinsky remains undaunted, 
and announced his intention to take his complaint to the Supreme Court. Yet 
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here he may face a bigger peril: Since no one has questioned the behavior of the 
CEC (at least during the polling), Yavlinsky’s fight is with the numerous regional 
election commissions, not the federal structure. (7) In the end, the sheer number 
of cases he would have to launch may prove too much even for him. 
 
Meanwhile, two parties are facing what may turn out to be serious divisions in the 
ranks. The Union of Right Forces, having lost out on party-list Duma seats, 
accepted the resignations of the party’s leaders — Boris Nemtsov, Irina 
Khakamada, Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar — at its January meeting, (8) 
and refused to back Khakamada’s announced candidacy in the presidential 
campaign. Out of 137 delegates present at the congress, only 61 delegates 
voted to support her run. (9) 
 
The voluntarily tendered resignations did little to appease the discontent within 
the party over the election results. According to a draft document developed by 
special working group set up to analyze the reasons for the party’s bleak 
showing, and led by Konstantin Remchukov — one of the contenders to lead the 
party — the blame rested on ineffective leadership at the federal level, 
particularly Nemtsov, Executive Committee Chairman Alfred Kokh, and the 
Executive Committee branch leaders. However, the working group suffered its 
own dissension over the report, and the document could not be finalized. (10) 
 
Khakamada’s candidacy also is causing ripples of discord within the ranks of 
YABLOKO. That party’s deputy chairman, Sergey Mitrokhin, warned that 
"measures will be taken" against party leaders who use party offices to assist in 
her quest for signatures. (11) 
 
Moreover, the electoral bloc that had joined the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (KPRF) with the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR) is 
undergoing its own crisis, as KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov and NPSR 
Executive Committee Chairman Gennady Semigin publicly trade insults. At issue: 
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Zyuganov’s responsibility for the KPRF’s dismal showing in the December 2003 
elections (according to Semigin) and Semigin’s "megalomania" (according to 
Zyuganov). (12) Another bloc already has dissolved — the coalition between 
Gennady Seleznev’s Party for the Rebirth of Russia and the Russian Party of 
Life. Indicating that he, at least, has learned his lesson (although a bit late for his 
political career), Seleznev said that his party would support Putin, and that the 
coalition with the Party of Life was a mistake. (13) 
 
Even electoral success is no guarantee of a long political relationship, however. 
Sergei Glazyev, who founded the Rodina (Motherland) bloc with Dmitri Rogozin, 
has formed a new movement, Popular Patriotic Union Rodina, to help his 
presidential campaign. One month after Rodina overcome the five-percent vote 
hurdle to obtain party-list Duma seats, the hastily formed bloc was demonstrating 
a remarkable lack of cohesiveness: Despite the administration's refusal to 
support the registration demands of presidential hopeful (and Rodina-backed) 
Viktor Gerashchenko, Rogozin would not support the self-nominated Glazyev's 
run. (14) 
 
... And burying the competition 
A recent poll indicates that Putin would receive nearly 80 percent of the vote in 
the 14 March elections, leaving his competitors in the dust. That popularity has 
brought the departure of one candidate, businessman Vladimir Bryntsalov, from 
the race. (15) Now Putin is facing six challengers, who have managed to submit 
either party nominations or the required number of signatures for registration: 
Khakamada; Federation Council Speaker Sergey Mironov; Ivan Rybkin, the 
former Security Council Secretary; Nikolay Kharitonov of the KPRF; Oleg 
Malyshkin of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR); and Sergey 
Glazyev, the leader of the Rodina bloc. (16) 
 
The motivation behind many of the candidacies remains questionable. While 
Mironov has repeatedly stated that he supports Putin wholeheartedly, and plans 
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to use the campaign as a platform to express his support of the man he’s 
challenging (17), another candidacy is raising eyebrows as well. Malyshkin had 
been viewed as the sacrificial goat meant to keep the LDPR in the campaign. 
Now it appears that his party has a more devious aim in mind — bait and switch. 
As LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky explained recently, "You just give us your 
votes and elect Malyshkin. He will appoint me the prime minister and will resign a 
month later." (18) Of course, Zhirinovsky’s use of the word "democratic" has 
always been, at best, ironic, and, at worst, insulting. 
 
Until recently, Zhirinovsky’s absence from the race was believed to have been 
due to the same thing keeping other party leaders from running: Putin cannot be 
beaten. Most are looking toward the subsequent presidential elections as their 
next chance for office, A new group has emerged that also is looking toward the 
end of Putin’s second term — not, necessarily, to regain office (although that’s 
always a possible motivation) but primarily to regain a semblance of democracy. 
Apparently, only the utter dearth of a democratic process can bring together 
Russia’s democrats (with some notable, and not unexpected, exceptions). The 
"2008 Committee: Free Choice," a collection of democrats, has announced its 
plans to seek "the election of a new president in 2008 through free and honest 
elections." (19) 
 
The committee’s founders include former Duma deputy and SPS leader Boris 
Nemtsov, Yevgeny Kiselev, editor of Moskovsky novosti, writer Viktor 
Shenderovich, poet Igor Irtenyev, economist Yuliya Latynina, and chess 
grandmaster Garry Kasparov. Declaring the 2004 elections to be "a farce," the 
committee members intend to stir up discontent among the usual suspects — 
students and local intelligentsia. "Democratic forces need to regroup. People, 
citizens have to consolidate on a very broad democratic platform. That is why we 
are talking about the problems of the year 2008. In other words, the train 2004 is 
gone. And nothing can be done about it," Kasparov said at a press conference 
last month. (20) 
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PARLIAMENT 
Deputies start flexing their muscles 
Still quite cocky with their success in the parliamentary elections, members of 
United Russia have proclaimed themselves king of the hill within the Duma and 
are now starting to shout it outside as well. Having taken all the committee 
chairmanships, (21) the party is ready to take over the government, according to 
Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov. "As a party of parliamentary majority, United 
Russia is ready to take part in forming the Cabinet of Ministers," Gryzlov said. 
Indeed, instead of leaving the pesky chore of deciding who should be considered 
for the cabinet to Putin, the party believes it should create a list from which Putin 
could choose. Indeed, the party’s leaders already have prepared a list to replace 
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov's cabinet. Deputy Speaker Oleg Morozov 
explained that "we are not going to blame our mistakes on anyone else and we 
feel no fear. As we fought to win, we must assume the entire responsibility now." 
(22) Candidates must be party members, Gryzlov said, although they will have to 
suspend their party membership immediately, since high-level state officials are 
banned from party memberships — de facto if not de jure, as Gryzlov himself 
demonstrated when he unofficially led the party while serving as Interior Minister. 
 
While Gryzlov manages to rule the Duma roost, his counterpart in the Federation 
Council, Sergey Mironov, has had to deal with a deputy unwilling to bow before 
him. Still, Mironov managed to squash the challenger. A conflict of opinion about 
how the Council should function led to the departure of the first deputy speaker, 
Valeri Goreglyad, who announced his resignation last month. "My decision is due 
to my ideological position and my convictions," he told journalists on 20 January. 
Stating that those convictions included the notion that all members of the 
Federation Council should have equal standing in basic parliamentary procedure, 
Goreglyad seemed to indicate that a power struggle was ongoing in the Council, 
with Mironov advocating the elimination of the deputy speaker position. 
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Goreglyad noted his own support for rotating the leadership of the Council, which 
he characterized as a "necessary element of democracy." (23) 
 
Alas, either his convictions or his standing against Mironov was shakier than he 
may have believed. Eight days later, Goreglyad explained his resignation 
differently, giving cause to expect his departure from the Council as well as from 
the deputy speaker post. "I have come to the conclusion that I have worked long 
enough in legislative bodies, and now I should try my hand in some other types 
of work — in executive bodies or economic entities," he said on 28 January. (24) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. The NIS Observed, 21 Jan 04; and Rossiyskaya gazeta, 27 Jan 04 via 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #8038, 29 Jan 04. 
2. Reuters, 26 Jan 04 via JRL #8032, 26 Jan 04. 
3. Ekho Moskvy, 0620 GMT, 27 Jan 04; BBC Monitoring via JRL #8035, 27 
Jan 04. 
4. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election 
Observation Mission Final Report, 27 Jan 04 via JRL #8041, 30 Jan 04. 
5. Novaya gazeta, no. 6, 29 Jan 04 via JRL #8041, 30 Jan 04. 
6. Ibid. 
7. ITAR-TASS, 1313 GMT, 22 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0122 via World 
News Connection. 
8. Moscow Times, 26 Jan 04 via JRL #8032, 26 Jan 04. 
9. ITAR-TASS, 1917 GMT, 24 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0124 via World 
News Connection. 
10. IZVESTIYA, 21 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0122 via World News 
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11.  (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21 Jan 04, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-2004-0121 via World 
News Connection. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly 
 
Throughout this article, when referring to equipment, the Russian name is cited 
first, followed by the NATO designation (if it has one) in quotes. 
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Yel'tsin had a Rock Concert, Putin has a War Game 
In another sign of resurgent efforts to conduct realistic training, Russia will soon 
hold its largest strategic war game in 22 years, according to reports from 
Moscow. This major military exercise is scheduled to take place for several days 
in the middle of this month and will involve numerous units in three military 
districts (Moscow, Leningrad and Volga-Urals), several bomber and tanker 
regiments of the 37th Air Army (Long Range Aviation Command), the Northern 
Fleet submarine force, both offensive and defensive units of the Strategic Missile 
Force and several elements of the Space Forces. Uniformed troops of the Interior 
Ministry (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) border units will also play 
important roles. Sources indicate that while the Ministry of Defense and the 
General Staff will be in overall control of the war games, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armed forces, 
will be personally involved in portions of the exercise and lead what we in the 
military call the "Hot Wash;" that is the "lessons-learned" conference conducted 
immediately after an exercise. () 
 
The business paper, Kommersant, which broke the story on 30 January 04, gave 
a detailed list of activities, which include units and commands across the breadth 
of Russia. Indications are that the exercise scenario will begin with forces at 
peacetime locations and readiness, and then ramp up through various levels of 
scripted pre-conflict tension (including what Russians call the "special period" just 
before hostilities), finally blossoming into full-scale war. () The MVD and FSB 
troops most likely will exercise their mission to secure the periphery and critical 
installations of the nation, while the military units and headquarters will increase 
their alert status and make all available forces ready for action. Once the forces 
are "cocked on" alert, they will report their readiness to execute the war plan 
through their various headquarters to Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin 
who, theoretically, will continually update Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and, 
probably President Putin. Although unconfirmed at this time, it seems highly 
probable that the higher command echelons, perhaps even including President 
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Putin, will decamp Moscow for the hardened underground bunkers in the vicinity 
that were built during the Cold War days. 
 
Next, a carefully flagged "EXERCISE ONLY" warning of simulated attack will be 
issued by the Russian attack warning system to the survivable elements of the 
military and government in their bunkers, where President Putin or more likely 
Minister Ivanov in the role of president, will issue an exercise attack order 
detailing the (scripted) attack response plan. At this point, the action will switch 
back to the tactical units. The 22nd Air Division will launch the 14 remaining 
Tupolev-160 "Blackjack" bombers in the Russian Air Force inventory, along with 
up to 22 TU-95MS "Bear H" bombers, all from Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast. 
Simultaneously, some of the 50 plus "Backfire C" non-strategic bombers of the 
52nd and 840th Bomber Regiments will launch from Shaikovka and Soltsy Air 
Bases, respectively. No mention was made of the 42 TU-95MS bombers of the 
73rd Heavy-Bomber Division at Ukrainka Air Base in Khabarovsk Krai, so it is 
likely they will maintain a real-world response capability while the other units 
exercise. As part of the exercise, some of the Tu-160s will launch unarmed Kh-
55 "AS-15 Kitchen" cruise missiles over the North Atlantic, while other Tu-160s 
and the Tu-95MS’s will conduct simulated cruise missile launches while flying 
over Siberia and the Arctic ice towards U.S. and Canadian airspace. Meanwhile, 
the "Backfire" bombers will drop conventional bombs on the Vladimirovka target 
range near Astrakhan. IL-78 "Midas" tankers forward deployed to various bases 
from their home at Ryazan Air Base will refuel the "Blackjacks" and "Bears" on 
their return routes. () 
 
Since Russia resumed these types of exercises in the late 1990’s, these polar 
route bombers, under the watchful eye of forward deployed U.S. and Canadian 
AWACS and fighter forces under NORAD command, have ventured to within 37 
miles of the Alaska Air Defense Intercept Zone (ADIZ) before veering back 
toward home. () 
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While upwards of several dozen aircraft range over Russia and the frozen north, 
the Strategic Missile Forces will conduct a test launch of an unarmed, but highly 
instrumented, Topol-M "SS-27" intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and a test 
warhead from the Russian ICBM test site at Plesetsk to the usual impact range 
on the Kamchatka peninsula. Similarly, a Northern Fleet Project 667BDRM "Delta 
IV" nuclear-powered SSBN of the 12th Submarine Squadron will sortie from its 
base at Gadzhiyevo (at Sayda Inlet in Yagelnaya Bay) to launch an unarmed 
RSM-54 "SS-N-23 Skiff" sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the Barents 
Sea test range. () 
 
Not to be left out, the only existing (ironic, isn’t it?) anti-ballistic missile system in 
the world, the A-135 ABM system defending Moscow, will participate in this 
exercise. The entire system, including the Don-2N phased-array radar, short-
range 53T6 "Gazelle" and long-range 51T6 "Gorgon" interceptor missiles will be 
run through a drill by their battle management center at Sofrino, outside Moscow. 
The 3rd Space and Missile Defense Army of the Space Forces, which runs the A-
135 system along the rest of the Russian early warning system, will also monitor 
the various ICBM, SLBM and space launches. () 
 
Finally, Russia will exercise a capability that the U.S. is not even close to at this 
time: rapid launch of replacement satellites lost in accidents or, in as this 
exercise, enemy actions. A Molniya-M booster will launch what is likely to be a 
Molniya-1T military communications satellite from Plesetsk, while a Zenith-2 
booster will launch an unknown type of satellite, likely also to be a military 
communications satellite or an Oko-type early-warning satellite. () 
 
This year’s exercise is similar in scope to a major Soviet war game held in 1982, 
known as the "seven-hour nuclear war," which reportedly inspired President 
Reagan to press ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI has evolved 
over the ensuing decades into today’s Ballistic Missile Defense program, which 
will soon have active elements in place. The current Russian exercise, unlike the 
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1982 war game, is unlikely to cause concern in the West, because, by treaty, 
Russia will notify the US (and others) of its intention to launch any ICBM or 
SLBM 24-hours in advance with a description of the launch and target areas. 
Whereas decades ago, such exercises were planned and conducted in secrecy, 
today both Russia and the US go to great lengths to ensure such activities are 
announced to the other well in advance. () 
 
The U.S. conducts similar exercises annually, to test the capability and readiness 
of its strategic nuclear (and in the last few years, strategic non-nuclear) 
reconnaissance and strike forces. The most recent "Global Guardian" exercise, 
involving American bombers and other strategic assets, was held in October 03. 
According to the U.S. Air Combat Command, "The primary purpose of the 
exercise was to test and validate emergency war order command, control and 
execution procedures." () 
 
Every nuclear-type exercise by either Russia or the U.S. is tightly scripted and 
controlled, both to achieve the best training benefit and to ensure there is no 
chance that anything will get out of control. Every message during this upcoming 
exercise will be flagged "EXERCISE ONLY" or "EXERCISE EXERCISE 
EXERCISE." Also, any test launches made during these war games will have 
unarmed, albeit highly-instrumented, missiles and warheads. The Russians have 
efficiently tied their tactical launch and deployment training to their operational 
level and national-strategic command and control exercises. 
 
U.S. plans are changing somewhat. The U.S. Strategic Command has been 
given new missions in the last few years which are much less nuclear oriented, 
so while Russia is conducting its largest nuclear exercise in decades, the U.S. 
exercise schedule calls for a regular, but much less robust set of nuclear war 
games each year. In the words of one briefing, "Nuke ops [are] no longer [the 
only] focus of [STRATCOM’s] command exercise program." () 
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Traditionally, Russia has conducted major war games at various force levels 
during what is known as the winter training cycle, and I have no doubt that there 
is a legitimate reason to conduct this exercise at this time. It also seems likely, as 
has been pointed out by several experts (), that the timing of the exercise is very 
beneficial to President Putin, coming as it does just weeks before the presidential 
election. Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the Center for Defense 
Information, observes that the Kremlin claim that this exercise is somehow tied to 
counter-terrorism training is bunk. Both Safranchuk and independent Russian 
military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer see the timing of this grand display of national 
might as more than coincidental. As Safranchuk noted, "The exercise will make a 
great show…" just prior to the 14 March election. () 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. Kommersant, 30 Jan 04; WPS Monitoring Agency, 
www.wps.ru/e_index.html via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #8042, 31 Jan 
04; AP via (www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/02/02/001.html). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. Detailed information on strategic forces is from "The Russian Nuclear 
Forces Project" run by The Center for Arms Control, Energy and 
Environmental Studies at The Moscow Institute of Physics and 
Technology. Aircraft details are at: 
http://www.russianforces.org/eng/aviation. For additional details see 
http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/hdb/Volume_103/Issue_01/ 
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By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
And the struggle goes on…. 
The Belarussian opposition coalition "Five-Plus" decided to nominate 220 
candidates to run in the parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for the fall 
of 2004. Not all names of the candidates are announced yet, but some are 
already known: former minister of foreign economic relations Mikhail Marynich, 
former presidential candidate Uladzimir Hancharyk, former defense minister 
Pavel Kazlowski and other prominent figures. (1) The opposition coalition is 
remaining optimistic about its ability to change the political situation in Belarus. 
The alliance leaders claim that the Five-Plus has managed to unite 90% of 
Belarussian political forces; over 200 NGOs have also joined the coalition. 
 
The government, meanwhile, continues to attempt to intimidate the opposition. In 
the past few weeks numerous anti-opposition "measures" have been taken by 
the authorities. On January 19, the leaders of six opposition parties were stopped 
at the Belarusian-Polish border; their belongings were searched and two leaders 
were subjected to personal searches. The Five-Plus leaders were travelling to 
Warsaw for a meeting with Polish politicians and journalists. (2) Also, the January 
edition of the unregistered Asambleya bulletin, the only national periodical in 
Belarus to provide coverage of NGO activities, was seized by forces from the 
prosecutor's office at the Minsk post office. (3) Furthermore, Belorusskaya 
Delovaya Gazeta (BDG) was denied distribution through the Belarussian post. 
(4) The opposition believes that this action is connected with the upcoming 
parliamentary elections in the fall. 
 
And the list goes on… The amount of governmental censorship and assault on 
the opposition that goes on in Belarus is so frequent that the news about these 
developments has become almost mundane - a rather scary situation, indicative 
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of a true dictatorship, in fact; a dictatorship which is endorsed by the majority of 
the Belarussians. 
 
Natural Gas supply update. 
After Gazprom stopped its gas supply to Belarus on January 1, 2004, Iteria and 
Nafta have remained Belarus' sole gas suppliers. They, too however, recently 
announced a halt in supplying natural gas to the country, as their protocols 
expired on January 16. Belarus was hoping to receive natural gas from Russia at 
Russian domestic prices, while Russia was requesting to be sold a stake in 
Beltranshaz in return. After the collapse of the Beltranshaz privatization deal, 
Gazprom announced that it was ready to supply natural gas to Belarus at market 
prices, withdrew from the talks on Beltranshaz and, later in the year, halted the 
gas supply to Belarus. (5) It is unlikely, however, that Putin will allow the problem 
to take its own course – he is too willing to negotiate and settle the issues of the 
Russian-Belarus Union as soon as possible. His latest suggested solution to the 
natural gas problem was to consider an intergovernmental loan to Belarus. (6) 
 
UKRAINE 
The Crimean authorities recently decided to make Russian citizens residing in 
Crimean autonomous republic pay six to ten times more for communal services 
(heating, water, etc.) than the rest of the Crimean population. As is so often the 
case, pensioners bear the brunt: Vladimir Udovichenko, a pensioner, complains: 
"If you live in a three-room flat, you now have to pay some 150 or 130 hryvnas. 
And your pension is 150 hryvnas." (7) A 68-year-old woman from Yalta had to 
pay three hryvnas per month for water supply, now she will have to pay six times 
as much, and, in addition, local authorities are demanding 500 hryvnas from her 
as a debt on previous payments. (8) 
 
There are approximately 170,000 Russian citizens residing in Crimea, who see 
these measures by the Crimean authorities as an act of discrimination, especially 
because they apply solely to Russian non-citizens. (9) [The total number of 
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ethnic Russian in Crimea amounted to 1,186,000 in 2001, so that those affected 
constitute 14.3% of Russians who are not citizens of Ukraine; 85.7% apparently 
are Ukrainian or dual citizens and remain unaffected — Ed] When confronted 
about the situation, Mr. Korniychuk, Crimean First Deputy Prime Minister said 
that Ukrainian housing codes guarantee low rents for Ukrainian citizens, but this 
provision does not extend to non-Ukrainian citizens. (10) 
 
Some Russian citizens residing in Crimea have been paying a premium for living 
there for quite some time: Namely, the servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet. For 
years, the Black Sea Fleet has paid exorbitant taxes. The commander of the 
Black Sea Fleet Vladimir Masorin gave an example. "The Black Sea ensemble 
sometimes gives paid concerts. On earning 25,000 hryvnas the ensemble has to 
pay 23,000 hryvnas in taxes." (11) This seems a little unfair given that the 
presence of the Black Sea Fleet has a positive influence on the economic 
situation of the region - as additional consumers of everything from uniforms to 
food, it bolsters the economy. In addition, Russia has been writing 90 million 
rubles off Ukraine's state debt annually. (12) 
 
The Crimean authorities appear to be acting arbitrarily If Ukraine is striving to 
become a member of the Western community, it should, at least, try to treat all 
non-citizens equitably, rather than focusing on the citizens of a single country. 
 
MOLDOVA 
On January 25, the opposition Christian Democratic Popular Party (CDPP) 
staged a rally in central Chisinau calling for the president's and the government's 
resignation, as well as early parliamentary elections. Apparently due to adverse 
weather conditions, only about 200 people took part in the rally. A non-stop four-
day storm prevented CDPP supporters from arriving from outside of Chisinau. 
The meeting was very short and its participants dispersed quickly. The irony of 
the whole undertaking was that there were probably more policeman in the 
central square of Chisinau than there were protesters. More than ten busses and 
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trucks were parked behind the government building with policemen in helmets, 
shields and carrying truncheons. (13) Their readiness to seal off the central 
square proved unnecessary. Since the rally was unauthorized, police made 
arrests and have started criminal cases against 30 people who took part in the 
protest. (14) 
 
The CDPP leader Iurie Rosca has a difficult time finding allies among other 
opposition movements. He recently called for the opposition to run as one voting 
block in the 2005 parliamentary elections; the suggestion was not taken favorably 
by other opposition party leaders. Dumitru Braghis, the leader of Our Moldova 
Alliance, claims that such unity will "only inflict damage on Our Moldova 
Allianace." (15) The Democratic Party leader Dumitru Diacov believes that such 
an initiative is too ambitious and the opposition is more likely to run in two voting 
blocks - right and left-center ones. (16) 
 
So, the Moldovan opposition remains split, which is rarely a recipe for success 
(even though different opposition forces did unite in the Committee for Defending 
Moldova's Independence and Constitution). The Moldovan President, Vladimir 
Voronin, is even getting worried about Moldova's next parliament becoming a 
one-party parliament. He cited a vivid example of recent Gagauzia elections, 
where 32 out of 33 people's deputies elected to the Popular Assembly are 
Communists. (17) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Reshuffles and crackdowns 
A recent scandal over the alleged wiretapping of certain parliamentary offices 
and changes in the election law codes have coincided with a rising opposition 
movement in Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan has reshuffled its government and 
threatened outspoken media sources. And a new media bill in Kazakhstan has 
been criticized, leaving to question the status of free speech in Central Asia. 
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Political Change in Kyrgyzstan 
On 12 January, 2004, two pro-government parties—Alga and Unity—announced 
a merger aimed at securing seats for the December 2005 parliamentary and 
presidential election. (1) On 14 January, seven opposition parties—Asaba, the 
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, Erk, Erkindik, Kairan-El, the Republican 
Party, and Young Kyrgyzstan — countered with their own coalition, For People’s 
Power, aimed at challenging the pro-government parties. (2) 
 
That same day, General Ismail Isakov, Chairman of the State Security 
Committee in the Kyrgyz Legislative Assembly (lower house of parliament) (3), 
held an impromptu press conference to make accusations that his office had 
been wiretapped. He told journalists he noticed a "very pungent smell in the air", 
which he initially believed to be a dead mouse. A technician investigated and 
found a listening device as well as a hose connected to a box (which Isakov 
speculated was being used to poison him). (4) 
 
Isakov, who estimated that the device had been there for up to 18 months (5) 
blamed the National Security Service (SNB) for the wiretaps and called for the 
resignation of the leadership of the SNB, "as secretly taping the telephone calls 
of a member of parliament or any other citizen is an unlawful act." (6) Shortly 
after the discovery of the listening device in Isakov’s office, five other opposition 
members — Azimbek Beknazarov, Ishenbai Kadyrbekov, Adakhan Madumarov, 
Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, and Omurbek Tekebaev — allegedly found similar 
devices that had been planted in their offices. (7) 
 
Kalyk Imankulov, Chief of the SNB, denied claims that the devices were the work 
of the SNB, as they were "far too primitive." He went on to add, "We do lag 
behind our colleagues in neighboring countries in terms of technical equipment, 
but the devices that we use on the sanction of prosecutor are much more modern 
than the ones found by these deputies. [We] stopped using such primitive 
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devices a decade ago. And we certainly don’t have gases or powders which lead 
to a slow death." (8) The listening devices, which appeared to be homemade, led 
the SNB to express interest in working with Russian or U.S. security services to 
stem opposition accusations of an unfair investigation. (9) 
 
On 15-16 January, amid accusations that Isakov’s press conference was merely 
a publicity stunt to draw attention to the opposition movement, parliament held a 
special plenary session. (10) On 19 January, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev met 
with community representatives from Bishkek and Chui Oblast and argued 
against early campaigning, categorizing such activities as frivolous and 
burdensome to the country’s economy. (11) 
 
Officially, the Central Election Commission (CEC) limits the number of days prior 
to an election that an individual can campaign for office — 20 days for local 
elections, 25 days for parliamentary campaigns, and 35 days for presidential 
campaigns. (12) The electoral process has been a point of contention between 
pro-government and opposition groups and recent amendments to the CEC 
Election Code, which resulted in 206 changes to the Election Code, seem not 
have resolved the bickering and posturing. (13) 
 
Accusations such as those made by Isakov, however, give opposition members 
press coverage that is invaluable to attaining both name recognition and 
identification as a worthy challenge to the current administration. But most 
significant is the population’s perception that there can be an opposition. On 28 
January, up to 400 persons gathered in Bishkek to demand the release from jail 
of Feliks Kulov, leader of Ar-Namys opposition party. (14) And at a more 
grassroots level, several dozen residents of Alamedin blocked the Bishkek-
Almaty highway to protest the interrupted supply of electricity. The protestors 
demanded to speak with government officials and, after reaching an agreement 
to unblock the highway, said they would continue to protest by blocking the road 
until their demands are met. (15) 
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Political Change in Tajikistan 
Following the December reshuffle and replacement of executive staff members, 
on 19 January Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov dismissed Vice-Premier 
Nigina Sharapova and a number of ministry level officials. (16) According to the 
president’s press secretary, Abdufattoh Sharipov, the restructuring is "intended to 
attract young and talented cadres to the affairs of government. And this step will 
also be a major factor in reducing the bureaucracy, so there won’t be any 
duplication." (17) Critics, however, note that most of the personnel changes were 
reflective of levels of commitment to Rakhmonov; one of the new appointees, 
Abdujabbaor Rakhmonov, hails from the same province as the president and all 
of the new appointees are from the same party as the president, the People’s 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan. (18) 
 
Since 1997, the opposition representation in government has fallen from 30 
percent to five percent (19) and opposition parties such as the Islamic 
Renaissance Party continue to encounter attempts to quiet their voice. (20) Ruzi 
Nav (New Day) and Nerui Sukhan (Power of the Word), two independent weekly 
newspapers, have been banned since late 2003 and two periodicals, Oila and 
Tojikiston, are being investigated by the government. The newspapers have 
been warned by the Tajik Prosecutor-General’s Office and the Ministry of Culture 
that if they continued publication of articles "undermining the honor and dignity" 
of the president and government, they would face permanent closure. (21) 
 
Media in Kazakhstan 
Free speech appears to be as threatened in Kazakhstan as it is in Tajikistan. A 
recent bill has been introduced to parliament which, opponents criticize, gives 
authorities excessive control over the media. While Sergei Duvanov, an 
independent journalist and outspoken critic of the government jailed since 2002 
(22), was recently released from prison; his "semi-free" status means that he 
remains under constant supervision. And since early January, one outspoken 
 35 
reporter has been beaten up, another faces sentencing on allegations of slander, 
and the independent newspaper Diapazon had its offices raided by police. (23) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. Eurasianet, 16 Jan 04 via www.eurasianet.org 
2. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 26 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
3. Isakov was also former leader of the Movement for the Resignation of 
Askar Akaev and Reforms for the People, and is thus a well known figure 
among the opposition movement. 
4. Isakov went on to comment about the box: "I believe they wanted to 
liquidate me this way, through gradual gassing. Sending small doses 
everyday, they would lead me to a heart attack." IWPR, 17 Jan 04 via 
www.iwpr.net 
5. Eurasianet, 16 Jan 04 via www.eurasianet.org 
6. IWPR, 17 Jan 04 via www.iwpr.net 
7. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 26 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org; Eurasianet, 16 
Jan 04 via www.eurasianet.org; IWPR, 17 Jan 04 via www.iwpr.net; and 
ITAR-TASS, 1452 GMT, 16 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0117 via World 
News Connection. 
8. IWPR, 17 Jan 04 via www.iwpr.net 
9. ITAR-TASS, 1452 GMT, 16 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0117 via World 
News Connection. 
10. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 26 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
11. IWPR, 29 Jan 04 via www.iwpr.net 
12. RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
13. RFE/RL, 28 Jan 04; RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
14. RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org. Kulov was a former Vice 
President and Mayor of Bishkek before he was imprisoned on charges of 
embezzlement and abuse of power. Kulov’s imprisonment kept him from 
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participating in the 2000 presidential elections, at which time he was seen 
as a strong opponent to Akaev. 
15. ITAR-TASS, 1332 GMT, 23 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0123 via World 
News Connection. 
16. ITAR-TASS, 1659 GMT, 19 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0119 via World 
News Connection. 
17. RFE/RL, 22 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
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19. RFE/RL, 22 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org 
20. See NIS Observed, 23 Jan 04 via www.bu.edu/iscip 
21. Eurasianet, 14 Jan 04 via www.eurasianet.org. The limits of the 
newspapers can be seen, for example, in how they cover political 
scandals without giving too many specifics. Transparency International 
listed Tajikistan as one of the world’s most corrupt countries — see NIS 
Observed, 24 Oct 03 via www.bu.edu/iscip — yet many journalists are 
leery of providing very much detail. The Tajik Financial Control Committee 
recently exposed the misuse of $5 million of government funds in 2003. 
What would be reported is the statistics — 1300 audits, 2000 officials 
administratively punished, 100 official fired, ITAR-TASS, 1506 GMT, 19 
Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0119 via World News Connection — rather than 
names of offenders. 
22.  Duvanov was arrested prior to a trip to Washington, DC, where he was 
scheduled to discuss the situation of the media as well as corruption in 
Kazakhstan. He was charged with the rape of a minor, a charge which he 
denies. 
23. RFE/RL, 22 Jan 04; RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Jan 04 via www.rferl.org; 
IWPR, 29 Jan 04 via www.iwpr.net 
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